interventionism in Laos and South Vietnam, together with the SEATO alliance, as a clear threat to Chinese security. Detente was completely unacceptable to them in such circumstances. In defiance of Moscow, Peking formulated a doctrine of contradiction between 'imperialists' and the 'oppressed nations and peoples'. The objective was to cultivate close relations, not only with communist powers like North Vietnam, but also neutrals, such as Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia. By these means Chinese leaders intended to unite, and then radicalize, an anti-imperialist bloc against the United States.
2 Such a proposition is not intended to serve as an apology for American containment measures against Peking, which ultimately received its fullest and most violent expression in Vietnam. Rather, it is merely to state the obvious; that in the early 1960s China was supplying both the Pathet Lao and Vietcong as part of a consistent strategy of reducing what was, from Peking's perspective, American hegemony in the region. Of course, such developments were viewed very differently in Washington.
Upon assuming office in early 1961 John F. Kennedy was determined to meet the Sino-Soviet challenge. Kennedy's strategy was two-pronged. In circumstances where a communist insurgency already threatened a friendly regime he was prepared to intervene with American men and materials. Nonetheless, with regard to Laos, he recognized that this was not possible. The small, mountainous, land-locked country, sharing a common border with China, appeared beyond the reach of even the US military.
3 Despite opting for neutralization in Laos, however, Kennedy and his advisers believed the United States had to meet the communist threat forcefully elsewhere in the region. Accordingly, from 1961 to November 1963, the administration increased the number of American 'advisers' in South Vietnam from 200 to 16,000. This was later described by historians as the counter-insurgency option; using special forces and techniques, deliberately fostered by the administration, to contain and then defeat communist guerrillas on the ground. 4 The second and complementary aspect of Kennedy's strategy has not been so well documented by historians. The administration considered it vital that nationalist movements elsewhere in Southeast Asia did not become communist, a process they believed had happened in Vietnam. In order to meet this objective, Kennedy encouraged a new approach to relations with neutral states. Rather than being antagonistic, the United States should accommodate itself to the nationalist aspirations of emerging nations. This vision of a new
